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sympathy, to the Jewish scriptures: if we want them we shall find them given with incomparable charm in the literature of the Ionian race. And so long as moral training shall be imparted through Christian agencies it is vitally necessary that those agencies should be kept in touch with the sources whence the early Church derived its most human inspiration. For present purposes then the ethical value of Hellenism may be defined as its influence in fixing attention on the purely moral side of the popular religion, and in preparing men's minds for the eventual reception of a morality independent of religious sanctions.

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RELIGION AND ETHICS.

THIS paper does not deal with the origins of religion and ethics but with their meaning and implications. It does not enter the domain of the positive sciences. "Modern physical science aims at a mechanical interpretation of all the phenomena of the universe,"* an unattainable ideal, but even if attained, were every effect explicable mechanically, yet would our inquiry remain untouched and our problem unsolved. So too, could we show fully the sociological and biological significance of religion and ethical functioning, we should thereby have led up merely to the beginning of our study. To show the mechanical sequences involved and the biological and sociological significance of these acts is to show that man in his religious and ethical nature is not a miracle, not an intruder, but a part of the one great system of the world. Accepting this, none the less the meaning of ethics and religion can be determined only by reflection based upon a study of their phenomena, and this is just as true even though we conclude that the full meaning is exhausted in the description of the method of their production. To make mechanism all, or most important, is to reach a conclusion which is metaphysical no less than

*Stallo—"Modern Physics," p. 15.

its opposite. My only desire in this introduction is to disown the wish to exclude any part of the subject from the scope of the investigation of the positive sciences while insisting upon the equal importance of metaphysical reflection.

Evidently, we cannot assume a supernatural origin. Such an assumption would take us out of the range of science and its investigation would be as far from our purpose as a discussion of the mechanical theory. The question between evolutionist and special creationist, if it be still a question, for us simply does not arise. We start with man as he is, as we know him to-day.

As he is to-day so he has been throughout the whole range of history with comparatively small modifications. And if appeal is made from this statement to the fact that man could make himself known to remote generations only when he had attained, substantially, the status he now occupies, we agree that the propositions are identical but point out that this man, as we know him, is our undoubted fact. To start with man at some hypothetical earlier stage as essential to our explanation, and then to reduce man's meaning to the significance of that relatively undeveloped stage, is to substitute theory for fact, and to give us in the name of the scientific imagination a new series of myths. In other words, it is an attempt to explain the known by the unknown, and, valuable and legitimate as the process may be, scientifically it cannot be permitted to throw discredit upon the facts we directly know.

Historically man is distinguished by the two features we are discussing, he is ethical and he is religious. Almost no other generalization rests upon a wider or more certain induction. It will, I suppose, be unchallenged, but needs of course definition. Let us begin with religion.

Religion is the recognition of super-sensible realities as superior and worshipful.

(a) Religion has to do with the invisible and the intangible. The merest peasant who worships the rock out of which a tree grows does not worship it as rock. Nor when he restrains the sacrilegious globe-trotter from throwing a can down the crater of a volcano with the exclamation, "It is God!" has he

any notion that the mountain *quâ* mountain is divine. It is not the stone, nor the tree, nor the image, nor the cave, nor the mountain, nor the sun, nor the river; but all these are sacred because they are not merely rock, river or tree. Let the peasant be convinced to the contrary, viz.: let him believe them to be so much brute matter and *ipso facto* he ceases to worship them. In the visible, which he does not worship, he is conscious of something more which he does worship.

And this same consciousness continues in all stages of religious development. The peasant conceives it under semi-materialistic forms, for so only can he think, while the idealistic philosopher calls it the transcendental and attempts to free it from all phenomenal elements; but in both alike is the feeling of a somewhat other than this visible and tangible world with which our senses have normally to do. In this, religious feeling differs from the æsthetic, for could the universe be shown to be, all in all, only a great machine, religion would vanish, but æsthetics I take it would continue in part at least as before.

(b) This supersensible somewhat is recognized as real; indeed, while in religious mood, as the highest reality. To the peasant its presence is mediated by things of sense, but it is more real than they and gives them their value. The conception varies, of course, with education until a Matthew Arnold thinks of "a stream of tendency," and different as his thought is from the semi-materialistic fancy of the fetish worshiper, yet he too conceives this "stream" not as mere ideal but as real.

(c) It is worshipful. The peasant bows before it, mutters his prayer, and feels in its presence awe, wonder, maybe fear, and worships. The philosopher may use no outward form, utter no word, and yet, putting this as highest, worship in spirit and in truth.

(d) It is good, that is, it meets the desires of the worshiper. The pacification of bad gods is a perversion of the religious sentiment, though the misconception from which it arises is natural enough. Even a religion avowedly pessimistic like Buddhism holds goodness fundamental. For the evils of existence may be escaped and the teaching of Buddha is a joyful

message of salvation. But the belief that man may be saved is faith in ultimate goodness, else the last word would be,—“Which way I fly is hell: Myself am hell;” and from despair comes no religion.

(e) And finally, this supersensible presence is believed to “respond” to the worshiper. Religion is not conceived as one-sided, beginning and ending in ourselves, but is communion with the transcendent and the divine. The “response” also is of course conceived variously, including the vague feeling stirred in the heart of the peasant, dreams and visions, the multiform phenomena of possession, the ecstasy of extreme emotionalism variously stimulated, deliverance through miraculous interference, communion with a personal God in Theistic religions, and the beatific vision of the philosopher who feels his individual self swallowed up in the Infinite and finds the peace which passeth all understanding as he perceives God to be all and in all.

These five elements then are constituent of religion, the unseen, the transcendent, recognized as real, as worshipful, the good and as “responding” to us. In all religions from lowest to highest they are found and together form an inclusive definition.

It follows that religion does not spring from fear (observe how dear to his heart is the religion of the devotee), though fear doubtless often stimulates and quickens the religious sense. Nor does it arise from the sense of dependence, though this is often closely related to it. But man worships, sometimes, that on which he does not recognize himself as dependent. It is not merely with prayers for help that the worshiper goes to his god, but fully as much with adoration and praise. The religious man, so to speak, instinctively worships, without needing further reason. Nor is religion the offspring of ignorance, though it is true the ignorant man ignorantly worships many things he afterwards recognizes as unworthy of being symbols of the Divine being. But this successive purification and correction no more prove that religion is essentially the offspring of ignorance than does the progressive rejection of

hypotheses and insufficient generalizations prove that science is the offspring of ignorance. Religion is not negative but positive, and to the religious man increase of knowledge means increase of worship, so that he shall worship most who knows most. Neither is religion the offspring of animism, nor of fetichism, nor of ancestor worship, nor of totemism. As well might one suppose it the offspring of Methodism, or of Presbyterianism. These are various expressions of the religious consciousness which is deeper than them all and source of them all. Nor is religion one with theologies, in any form. It does not come from our instinct of causality, or of personality. Theologies are philosophies or cosmologies, crude or profound, explanations of the phenomena, varying with each grade of man's evolution. Theology none the less, as matter of course, influences religion and this at every stage. For our separation of the religious feeling from the theological concept is more or less artificial, since consciousness always contains feeling, thought and will. Let us discuss this a little more fully.

Could philosophy demonstrate the unreality of the being worshiped, not by this worshiper or that, but in general so that material elements would represent the all, religion as we have seen would cease. Could theology establish an absentee God, who had at some time revealed his will but had now withdrawn himself, again religion would disappear. There might be the obligation to believe certain statements touching such a God, but none to worship, and by hypothesis no communion with him. At best there would be a belief in such communion in some future world. But, apart from such extreme views, theology must modify the content of the religious consciousness at every point. Our theology varies with every variation in our general view of the world and therefore it is vain to look for agreement in the developed contents, but only in the vague and primary feelings as above interpreted. For example, if we begin with our open-mouthed peasant in Japan going on a pilgrimage, we shall get from him no answer which is articulate. The wonderful to him is God, mediated to him by the unusual in nature and in man and in art. When more educated

he will speak of *rei*, meaning some mysterious personage, and of *ki*, a mysterious power. Trained by a priest he will speak of the *hotoke* (Buddhas), and of gods many and diverse. With these differing conceptions, theologies, he will narrate a differing experience. That is, he interprets his religious experience in terms of his theology and by means of his theology brings new experiences under the head of religion, rejecting old expressions and experiences as no longer adequate. At the lowest he will worship the wonderful, at the highest, trained now in Chinese philosophy, he will give up native gods and shrines, will reject Buddhist images and temples and will say, "Fear the will of Heaven. When man leaves all else and is humane and true he accords with Heaven; it surely cherishes and embraces him." At the starting point is a feeling vague and almost indescribable, and a theology equally vague and inarticulate, with a worship unorganized and of simplest form. But as the conceptions grow in clearness so does the experience. In well-defined polytheism are direct communications from the gods, direct answers to prayers, a priesthood, sacrifices, temples and an experience, mediated by all these, itself elaborate and complex. So through all forms, henotheistic, monotheistic, pantheistic, the religious element remains but varies, is impoverished or enriched, ennobled or debased according to man's stage of culture and his general view of the world. Even in the highest abstraction, in the pantheistic view which seeks oneness and not communion there is still language which can be interpreted only in the tones of all religious experience, and man may be God-intoxicated while denying God. Like the peasant, though from the other extreme, he too can find no words to express that which he feels and knows.

We separate then the two elements, the religious instinct present in all forms, and the developed religious consciousness dependent upon our general view of the world and modified directly by our theology. From this the inference is obvious, viz.:—that we can make few statements as to religion in general, but must discuss religions in particular, if we would go beyond these vague and general points all have in common.

For example, we ask—Is religion beneficial? But we can only answer—What religion? From its emotional nature religion lends itself readily to immorality, and to superstition. To immorality because the religious feelings are akin to other feelings and unless carefully discriminated are associated with sensuality, fear, anger, cruelty and the like. Religion then gives its sanction to these passions and forms a combination of terrible strength and evil. The religious feeling like all others longs for gratification, is of great strength, and may readily be misled into supposing itself gratified through the stimulation of other passions. It lends itself with equal readiness to superstition, for it precedes a reasoned view of the world, lays hold uncritically of objects and teachings which seem to offer it a basis, renders its objects sacred, objects to their criticism, and thus remains in the past while the science of the present moves on to other view-points. Thus results the never-ending conflict not only of science and theology, but of science and religion in so far as the religious experience clings to and finds expression through the conceptions of the past held sacred in theology. No religious feeling is “pure” but each is in part offspring of concepts which are joined with these feelings from the beginning, and therefore at no stage has this conflict been escaped excepting when for uncertain periods man’s view of the world has remained unchanged and in harmony with the cosmological teachings of the prevalent religious faith.

As thus religion is not essentially a philosophy, or a cosmology, though it is in all stages associated with these; so, too, religion is to be distinguished from ethics. Even when somewhat developed it may have no ethical code. It is said that *Shinto* has as its teaching only this,—Fear the gods and obey the Emperor! But in its earliest book there is not even this teaching, nothing which implies either as an ethical maxim. The later writers explain this unusual feature by saying that the Japanese, being holy by nature, needed no moral code, which was invented by immoral folk like the Hindus and the Chinese. But even the mythology of the *Kojiki* offers ethical material of a sort, that is, it indicates the ethics of its own time and shows the current conceptions of right and wrong, though

not yet as moral precepts binding upon others, or on anyone. It reflects the ethical, as it reflects the political and social condition of the people, but is not itself ethical more than political. Nor in its development is religion necessarily ethical. Indeed an argument to the effect that it is a drag on ethical progress might well be made, since its mythology renders sacred a moral state which has been transcended, and deeds are ascribed to the gods which are abhorrent to men. Sanctions too are sought in their words and conduct for acts condemned by prevalent standards. Then antinomies result and religion is denied in the name of ethics.

But the phenomena are by means so uniform that one may deduce a consistent philosophy of this relationship. Doubtless ethical teaching in a somewhat pure and high state of development, in advance even of the development of the masses of the people, has been associated with religion, and a sanction for right conduct in religious teaching of a future judgment has been a powerful impetus to a relatively right conduct. Huxley thinks that men without moral sense can only be compelled by fear and religion has supplied this fear. But in certain instances religion has gone beyond this.

The best division of religion is into natural and ethical, or natural and personal, which comes to the same thing. Of course, no division is satisfactory, but this for the moment will answer our purpose. Here we come, in the second class, to the great religions which go back to an historical founder—Buddhism, Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. All of these religions unite ethics with religion in a fashion which is comparatively unknown in the religions which cannot thus be traced back to great teachers. The most striking illustration of all is found in the prophets of Israel who transformed a tribal worship into ethical monotheism with, as result, a conception of God of the highest significance. To these men righteousness is the fundamental fact and God is worshipful because he is holy. The one appeal is to conscience—and religion finds its consummation in ethics.

In turning to this second subject we follow the same order of discussion. We are not concerned with the topics, that is

to say, which take up the largest place in such discussions usually, but in that which has a relatively small place. We are not then to ask the origin of our ethical instinct, whether created or evolved; nor as to our ethical judgments, whether gained by experience or through intuition; nor with special types of ethical doctrine; nor with the distinctions of ethical maxims. Clifford says that the "maxims of ethics are hypothetical maxims, derived from experience and based on the assumption of the uniformity of nature." And again, "By morals I mean the doctrine of a special kind of pleasure or displeasure which is felt by the human mind in contemplating certain courses of conduct, whereby they are felt to be right or wrong." We might fear a murderer "but every one knows that these feelings are quite distinct, different from the feelings which condemn murder as a wrong thing it is as distinct and recognizable as the feeling of pleasure in a sweet taste." "The particular things commanded or forbidden depend upon the character of the individual in whose mind they arise."* In the same essay Clifford derives man's moral sense from his tribal relations, though he thus clearly enough recognizes the instinct as something deeper than this derivation would indicate. Huxley also, in his Romanes lecture on Evolution and Ethics, professes to show the origin of ethics in the wolves which can hunt in packs on the tacit agreement that they will not hurt each other. But he says elsewhere† that the origin of the moral sense is undiscoverable, "they who have it need no other motive, while the rules of conduct can be discovered in the same way as others by observation and experiment." Now we, as in the earlier part of this discussion, are concerned with this moral sense, but not with its origin. It does not concern us to decide whether its origin be undiscoverable or whether it can be sought out—or if the latter be true, which one of a dozen theories is correct. Suppose we take Clifford's phrase and think of the maxims as hypothetical; this being right, do it; and correcting our tradi-

*"Lectures and Essays," ii., pp. 106-126.

† "Life and Letters," ii., 324.

tional and inherited conscience by our reason, using the term in its narrower sense, let us determine the right as we will. Being thus finally determined the moral sense responds: Do it. This moral sense is the *prius* of all ethical systems, of all ethical maxims, and is not explicable by those maxims. It belongs with the deepest sensibilities, as Huxley puts it. Our question then has to do with this moral sense or instinct, and not with any empirical contents. We ask, why should we give heed to this sense, and respond affirmatively to the "ought"? We may indeed dismiss the sense of obligation as illusion, though thus doing we shall find it difficult to escape *maya* anywhere in the whole universe. Or we may say we do not respond to it, being right supplies no motive for my conduct; but then though we frankly separate ourselves from the moral world, we still discuss it as the man with no sense for music discusses it as phenomenon in others. But our problem is not even as to the existence of the feeling of oughtness, neither its origin, nor its universality, nor its character, nor its contents; but only this, the right being discovered, why should I do it?

The first thing which strikes the attention is this: moral science differs from the positive sciences in that its special and primary object is "to determine what ought to be, and not to ascertain what merely is."* Mr. Sidgwick continues—"Ethical Science might, according to usage, denote studies that deal with the actually existent, viz., either the department of Psychology that deals with pleasures and pains, desires and volitions, moral sentiments and judgments, as actual phenomena of individual human minds; or the department of Sociology dealing with similar phenomena, as exhibited by the larger organizations of which individual human beings are elements. We observe, however, that comparatively few persons pursue these studies from pure curiosity, in order merely to ascertain what actually exists, has existed, or will exist in time. Most men wish not only to understand human action, but also to regulate it; they apply the ideas 'good' and 'bad,' 'right' and 'wrong,' to the conduct or institutions which they describe; and thus

*"Methods of Ethics," p. 1.

pass, as I should say, from the point of view of Psychology and of Sociology to the point of view of Ethics. It is true the mutual implication of the two kinds of study is, on any theory, very close and complete." And yet the distinction is clear and to be made, and thus distinguishing, let me repeat, ethics deals not merely with that which is but with that which should be.

The man of good form conforms to the multitude. It is the sufficient plea that everyone does it. In ethics this plea is inadmissible. To go with the multitude to do evil is to be condemned. That everyone does it is not accepted by this tribunal. It rejects the rule which says, whatever is, is right. To justify feathering one's own nest because speculation is in fashion, to teach sophistry because sophists abound and are popular, to applaud aggression and support it in our government because the world is being divided among the great powers, to cling to possessions or even to life in preference to principle, is to repudiate ethics.

Not only does the ethical sense appeal from that which is to that which should be, it imperatively commands obedience. When once determined no dispute is possible. We may indeed disobey, but, disobeying, we forsake moral ground and to the moral man disobedience is impossible. For example, Mr. Huxley recognized nature as non-moral and terrible. He also knew it to be the fashion to cover up the facts, preaching peace when there is no peace; but for himself "he would rather have a millstone tied to his neck and be cast into the sea than to be with those who cover up these awful realities."* John Stuart Mill we remember elected Hell rather than declare that to be just in God which is unjust in man, and plain men in every land and age have suffered the loss of all things and even of life itself in obedience to this imperative ought, witnesses to that which is not but should be. Prudence dictates a careful following of the way of the world. The moral sense often demands that we forsake it at all hazards. Our question is, how can this be rational?

Another instance illustrates the same fact from a different

*"Life and Letters, ii., 323.

point of view. Nothing is more impressive than the development of the scientific conscience. By its rigorous method it separates natural knowledge from "the human prejudice and hasty ingenuity and delusive rhetoric or poetry which might have adulterated it." No seeming good, no apparent gain is to turn the man of science from devotion to his facts. And yet it is not devotion to facts precisely—not to the world as known. "Science is an ordered systematic pursuit of knowledge."* The fact we now have is only a starting place for adventure in search of facts not yet known. Romanes† with his usual convincing clearness sets forth the method of science. It is from facts to hypothesis and from hypothesis to facts again, and so to more facts and new hypotheses in constantly widening circles. Haeckel‡ insists upon the same truth and points out the provisional nature of all hypotheses. Each theory is held as a working hypothesis, the best basket, it has been said, in which to get our eggs to market, but when it has served its turn, to be cast aside for a new basket holding in safety our larger supply of eggs. This strict relativity of scientific knowledge is one of its most striking characteristics. It is an unending search for truth, and every truth attained is accepted only as an instalment to be supplemented and corrected by greater truths to come.

Let me dwell for an instance upon this phase of scientific faith. It involves certain remarkable beliefs. It believes that truth can be found in the very act of confessing that it has not been found. Given evil in the world and we find it hard to believe in fundamental goodness, but, given error and we have no difficulty in its despite in believing that truth exists and can be found. Of course there are sceptics here also, but the true sceptic must abjure science and he to whom the scientific conscience is a fact is not disturbed though some men think him a fool for his pains.

From the world which is known science then fares forth to the world which is not known, and the scientific conscience,

*"Groundwork of Science," p. 3.

†"Darwin and after Darwin," pp. 1-8.

‡"The Riddle of the Universe," pp. 299f.

in its command to be true to facts, rests in the belief that this unknown world can be known, and being known will prove worth the knowing; indeed, better worth the knowing than the world we know. That is the motive for the adventure and it is believed in spite of all seeming evidence to the contrary. Let me quote an extreme instance—

"So far as I am individually concerned the result of this analysis has been to show that, whether I regard the problem of Theism on the lower plane of strictly relative probability, or on the higher plane of purely formal considerations, it equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all belief of the kind which I conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my intellect in regard to this matter into an attitude of the purest scepticism. And . . . I am not ashamed to confess that with this virtual negation of God, the universe to me has lost its soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept of 'work while it is day' will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly intensified meaning of the words 'that the night cometh when no man can work,' yet when at times I think . . . of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as I now find it—at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age—or whether it is due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words of Hamilton—Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, but of annihilation, the precept *Know thyself* has been transformed into the terrible oracle of Aedipus—'Mayst thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art.' " *

This then is the climax, the awful vision of that which is compared with that which was supposed to be. But it does not represent at all the depths of Romanes's faith, for he tells us just above—

"It is therefore with the utmost sorrow that I feel myself compelled to accept the conclusions here worked out. . . . Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be most profitable for the race—so I am persuaded that every individual effort to attain it . . . ought to be the common property of all men, no matter in what direction the results of its promulgation may appear to tend." †

What then does this mean? That though the universe lose

*"A Candid Examination of Theism," by Physicus (George John Romanes), p. 114.

†Ibid, p. 113.

its soul of loveliness, yet the only way to well-being is in casting aside all garments of make-believe and accepting truth. On other terms, truth is better than make-believe, however lovely the latter and alluring. Let me again insist, in view of this confession of faith, the scientific conscience demands loyalty to truth at all cost; not to truth as known merely but to truth as yet unknown, in the belief that this truth exists, can be found and is better than our present body of knowledge and better than all the rainbow colors of our most artistic imaginations.

One illustration more. Herbert Spencer in the "Data of Ethics" sets forth a doctrine which shows the ethical man to be the relatively more developed man. The prophet, so to speak, is in advance of his time and shows what is to be. The criminal lags behind and shows the state which is vanishing away. So we, if we be ethical, feel the stirrings of the new time which as yet is not, and we go unhesitatingly as martyrs to prison and stake in obedience to our sense of right. This protest against the present, this appeal to the future is of the nature of the truly ethical man. Here again, as in the two preceding cases, we find the same fact and the same implication. Why should the prophet be true to that which is to be at the cost of renouncing all which is?

In all our ethical study we find the same phenomena, and must—if it be the study not of that which is but of that which ought to be. In its name Huxley will have a millstone tied around his neck, and Stuart Mill will sink deeper than the depths of Huxley's sea, and Romanes will let the universe lose its soul of loveliness, and the plain man will come to want and suffer all this present world can know of loss and woe. Our question is, what is the reason for this, in Huxley, Mill, Romanes, and the unrhetorical plain man?

If I understand him aright, Huxley says merely I do not know. That is complete agnosticism. Why should you do right? I do not know. If I have the moral sense, I'll obey it; if I have it not, I'll disobey it, and that is the end of it. But this is to make the irrational supreme and final, and to act not as a man but from an instinct which is blind. And

Huxley is in still deeper difficulty, for evolution is evil and this is the devil's world, as he repeats over and over again, and in the Calvinistic theology he sees merely an anthropomorphic statement of these scientific facts. "Of moral purpose I see no trace in nature. That is an article of exclusively human manufacture and very much to our credit."* In his Romanes lecture (p. 6), he describes the ethical man as kicking down the ladder by which he climbed to his present stage, and in another place holds that the criminal is a product of evolution as truly as the saint, and from this point of view no more blameable. He will therefore have no ethics of evolution at all. But if this be the cosmic process and the whole of it, by what rational process can man be asked to separate himself and set up a rule of conduct of his own exclusive manufacture, the reason for which he himself cannot state? He has it, himself has made it, he would have a millstone tied around his neck and be cast into the sea rather than disobey it, but he has no rational explanation for it. Why, in a world in which the struggle for existence is the law and the strongest survive, man should give himself a golden rule and condemn himself for violating it is not apparent. It is an appeal to a blind faith.

Spencer faces the question and gives his answer. † "If for the divine will, supposed to be supernaturally revealed, we substitute the naturally revealed end towards which the Power manifested throughout evolution works: then since evolution has been, and is still, working towards the highest life, it follows that conforming to these principles by which the highest life is achieved is furthering that end. The doctrine that perfection or excellence of nature should be the object of pursuit, is in one sense true; for it tacitly recognizes that ideal form of being which is the highest." This answer suggests our final discussion.

Men, I take it, do not chase rainbows. They do not surrender that which is for that which is not, the real for a mere

*"Life and Letters," p. ii., p. 285.

†"Data of Ethics," pp. 171f.

ideal, the present for an impossible future. Let it be made apparent that evolution as Huxley describes it, *i. e.*, without moral elements, mistakenly as I think, is all: Let it appear that the universe is the vision of horror from which Romanes turned; let it be supposed that that which is, in the empirical sense, is all, and ethics cease or become strictly irrational. There is no answer to the question, why should I do right? and no reason for my choosing or seeking right. But equally there is no reason why science should seek truth.

It is not that which is known empirically which can answer the question. But in all the range, in the plain man who will not sin, in Mill and Huxley in their refusal to go with the multitude to speak evil, in Romanes representative of the scientific man who will be true to the truth, no matter what specters affright, and in Spencer, representative of the prophet who prefers to suffer now as incarnation of the virtue which is to be, the appeal is to the deeper truth, the deeper fact, the reality which transcends that which now is and that which now is known. In the theological language but in the strictest sense the appeal is from the things which are seen to the things which are unseen. In Lotze's thought, the things which *should be*—in deepest sense *are*.

To sum up: Ethics can be rendered rational only on the assumption that there is a reality deeper than the phenomenal world of sense, truer than the world we know and better. Religion is the intuition, the recognition of this reality. It becomes corrupt through its identification with other feelings and passions. Its explanation—theology—becomes superstition through a too ready and uncritical identification of this reality with the symbols and concepts belonging to the varying stages of man's development, determined as theology is by our general view of the world.

Religion becomes worthy only as it is ethical—being thus delivered from false alliances with other feelings and passions; and this unity of ethics and religion has its basis on the facts pointed out above—religion being the feeling of the reality which the ethical sense implicates. The great founders of ethical religion—especially the Hebrew prophets—by insight

or inspiration—attained the unity maintained in this paper—a unity we thus justify by reflection.

But ethical systems like theological, identify too readily empirical teachings, hypothetical maxims, with ultimate truth. They equally with theology can be set free from superstition only by the method and the results of scientific inquiry. Nor is this something lugged in *ab extra*, for science in its devotion to truth is ethical in the truest sense, and by its search for a higher and better truth postulates the reality which religion trusts.

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THE CONCEPTION OF NATURE IN THE POEMS OF MEREDITH.

SINCE the beginning of philosophy, the word "Nature" has been the centre of ambiguities, many of them, no doubt, due to mere confusion, but some, it may well be, pointing to conceptions of real value. The whole subject has never been more pressing than now, and it seems worth while to examine in this connection the work of George Meredith, the last of our poets who has sung of a faith in Nature and a lesson from Nature with high and persistent confidence.

At the outset it will be well to restate the chief of the meanings current. On this hand, "nature" is used in what one might call an external sense, either to denote the world as it appears apart from man—the world of the earth and the wild animals, of the sky and the stars—or to include with this all that happens to man as to other creatures except what is due to his own action. On the other hand, it may refer to the inner world in the heart of man himself, and here it may mean all impulses whatsoever, or only those that tend towards fulness of physical life in the individual. Further, and still more important to note, "natural" is used in the sense of "good," good according to the standard set by man, and this both for